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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Entwicklung von Wohlfahrtsstaaten in der erweiterten Europäischen Union – 
Reformen in den neuen post-sozialistischen Mitgliedsstaaten. 
 
Die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union bietet nicht zuletzt auch Herausforderun-
gen für die westeuropäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten, die in der Literatur häufig als Bedro-
hung analysiert werden. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Entwicklung der 
Sozialversicherungssysteme in acht postsozialistischen Staaten, die 2004 in die Eu-
ropäische Union aufgenommen wurden, Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Polen, Slowakei, 
Slowenien, Ungarn und die tschechische Republik (EU-8). 
Wir untersuchen sowohl institutionelle Designs und Performance als auch den 
Einfluss externer und interner Akteure auf die wohlfahrtsstaatliche Entwicklung in 
diesen Ländern. Wie unterscheiden sie sich von westeuropäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten 
und wie passen sie in gängige Typologien von Wohlfahrtsstaat-Regimen? 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Welfare State Formation in the Enlarged European Union—Patterns of Reform in 
the Post-Communist New Member States 
 
Eastern Enlargement of the European Union challenged the design of European Wel-
fare states. Many authors discuss the impact of East European social security systems 
on their West European counterparts and fear a “race to the bottom”. This paper ad-
dresses welfare state developments in the eight post-socialist new member states 
which completed the accession process in 2004, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia (EU-8). 
We focus on institutional patterns and performance as well as on the impact of 
internal and external actors of welfare state formation. How do the EU-8 diverge from 
West European welfare states and how do they fit into the typology of welfare state 
regimes? 
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Introduction 
The development of the political economies of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE), including their welfare systems, has been shaped in the past—and is 
likely to be so the future—by two sets of determinants: namely, the past and the West. 
“The past” refers to the material, political, and cultural legacies of the old regime of 
state socialism that suffered a definitive collapse in 1989, as well as the collective 
experience of the circumstances of its breakdown. “The West” in this context refers to 
external economic, political, national, and supranational actors in the West, among 
which one of the most significant has certainly been the European Union and its strat-
egy of eastern enlargement (EE) and associated efforts to integrate the new member 
states into the EU. In addition to these two bundles of determinants which have largely 
shaped the CEE welfare states, a third one consisted in the strategic considerations 
which entered into the politics of reform by post-communist political elites who had to 
cope with the realities of post-communist economies (these have, in part, experienced 
severe transformation crises) and a nascent system of democratic politics and policies 
(with drastically enhanced liberties and other political resources being available to the 
populations of the post-authoritarian regimes). 
This paper addresses welfare state developments in the eight post-socialist new 
member states which completed the accession process in 2004 (henceforth termed 
“EU-8”): Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
and Slovenia. (The newest round of enlargement, which went into effect on 1 January 
2007 and includes Bulgaria and Romania, will remain outside the present discussion.) 
Our discussion will focus upon strategies of external and internal actors concerning 
welfare state reforms, and on the institutional arrangements as well as performance 
characteristics of CEE welfare states. We shall also address the controversial issue of 
whether and in what sense the emerging CEE welfare states diverge from the Euro-
pean social model (ESM) or any of the three well-known welfare state “regimes”, be it 
because they must be described as a “new” regime type or be it that they converge 
with the Anglo-Saxon “residualist” model, as has been widely suggested in the litera-
ture. 
Eastern enlargement and the accession of new member states is a two-sided 
process in which two categories of actors played a strategic role. On the one hand, 
there is the Commission, representing the members of the old EU-151 that initiated, 
guided, and controlled the eastern enlargement process. On the other hand, there are 
                                                          
1 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain. 
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the accession countries themselves who, mostly one-by-one, negotiated their way into 
the EU by cumulatively complying with the conditions on which the Commission had 
made their accession contingent, such as the adoption of the acquis communautaire 
and the establishment of administrative structures that are required for its effective 
implementation. What were the prevailing interests and strategic motives on either 
side that drove the convergent process which culminated in the enlargement becoming 
effective on 1 May 2004? More specifically, what kind of considerations led the po-
litical elites in the post-communist accession countries to swallow some bitter pills and 
agree to the costly concessions entailed in those conditions stipulated by the Commis-
sion? And why did the Commission and its Enlargement Commissioner choose to 
push ahead with eastern enlargement despite clear evidence that both the magnitude of 
this round of enlargement, the largest in the history of the EU, and the inferior level of 
economic performance of the new member states would burden the old member states 
with costly obligations extending indefinitely into the future? 
In order to resolve this dual puzzle of strategic motivation, we hypothesize in an 
admittedly highly schematic fashion that the convergent process of enlargement was 
guided by two sets of prioritized objectives, economic and political ones, one of which 
was dominant on either of the two sides. That is to say, the timely completion of the 
enlargement process was driven by predominantly economic motives within the new 
member states and predominantly political ones on the part of representative actors of 
the EU-15. While elites in the former had good reasons to consider the move of join-
ing the EU a step that would boost their prosperity through full market integration, 
thus providing an opportunity that they could not afford to miss, EU-15 elites em-
barked on the road to enlargement primarily because they expected the incorporation 
of the new EU-8 into the EU system of rules and institutions to promote long-term 
stability and further democratic consolidation of the regimes in the region. This admit-
tedly daring generalization is, to an extent, supported by the observation that the 
doubts that have been raised among the EU-15, the western member states, concerning 
the wisdom of enlargement seem to be mainly concerned with the adverse economic 
repercussions of eastern enlargement, be they in the form of outflow of investment or 
influx of goods and labor. Concerning labor mobility, it was in particular (and for 
obvious geographic reasons) Germany and Austria who successfully tried to delay 
(quite likely until the year 2011) the point at which full labor mobility between old and 
new member states can be granted to workers from new member states. Only three 
EU-15 countries accepted free movement from the day of accession—a number that 
increased to eight of the 15 who accepted free movement of workers from May 2006 
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on. Conversely, doubts and skeptical views among the CEE accession countries were 
of a cultural and political kind. We shall further elaborate this argument at the end of 
the present analysis. 
Needless to say, eastern enlargement had already begun long before 2004, when 
it came to its formal completion. The EU had concluded Association Agreements with 
all countries of the region as early as from 1991 to 1993, and in 1993 decided upon a 
set of (“Copenhagen”) criteria for membership eligibility. The EU received applica-
tions for membership between 1994 and 1996, and decided to open accession negotia-
tions at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. In the early 1990s, once the trade 
barriers between the CEE region and the EU had been abolished (cf. Clement et al., 
2002: table 7, statistical annex), foreign investors began to invest in the post-
communist economies. The total amount of western foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the region is estimated to have reached € 150 billion by 2004. Such investment ac-
counted for up to five per cent of the GDP for many of the CEE countries and helped 
in the process of economic recovery (Barysch, 2005: 2 f.). In addition, EU pre-
accession programs such as PHARE, ISPA, and SAPARD have assisted the process of 
conversion to the market economy, with PHARE alone having spent € 10 billion in the 
period from 1990 to 2003, and, from 1990 to 2005, the EU having made payments to 
all new member states (EU-10)2 totaling nearly € 30 billion (EU Commission 2006: 
20 f.) Conversely, exports from the region into the EU-15 boomed throughout the 
1990s and led to growth rates in EU-83 economies, which were well above the EU-15 
average (see table 1). Both political and the economic integration (not to forget mili-
tary integration in the framework of NATO) had a long pre-history anteceding formal 
enlargement. 
It seems worthwhile to dwell for a moment on why eastern enlargement turned 
out to be such an unexpectedly smooth and rapid process, as emphasized by the EU 
Commission (EU Commission 2006). As far as aspiring member states in the region 
were concerned, the majority of political and newly emerging economic elites saw EU 
membership as an economic opportunity that they could not afford to miss for the sake 
of their respective countries’ economic prosperity, in spite of the sometimes harsh 
requirements that EU strategy and its conditions for accession imposed upon them. As 
a matter of supranational legislation that did, in fact, bypass national parliaments (or, 
as some saw it, reduced them to virtual rubber stamps), new member states had to 
                                                          
2 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slowakia, Slowenia. 
3 Czech Republlic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slowakia, Slowenia. 
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adopt (and make credible promises to implement) some 80,000 pages of the acquis 
communautaire, the body of European law.  
EU-8 elites complied with this procedure for one (or some combination) of three 
motivations (as usefully distinguished by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 
Introduction). First, compliance can be “outward-looking”, i.e., motivated by credible 
commitments made by the EU and the expected rewards that come with membership. 
Second, compliance can be due to the “pull” of a genuine forward-looking expectation 
that EU membership and everything that comes with it will turn out to be the norma-
tively right and appropriate way to proceed. Finally, compliance can also stem from 
backward-looking considerations, i.e., the “push” of the grim realities and massive 
failures of the institutional arrangements of state socialism, to which every alternative 
must be unconditionally preferred.4 As far as non-elites in the CEE were concerned, 
there was widespread concern over threats to the newly won national autonomy by the 
EU—concerns that continue to be capitalized on by anti-European populist parties that 
have emerged in a number of countries in the region. 
But why were member states and European elites of the EU-15 ready to engage 
in the greatest, most expensive, and foreseeably most consequential round of enlarge-
ment in the history of the EU? Never before had the EU admitted such a large group of 
new member states at one point in time; and, even more significantly, never before had 
it offered membership to states most of whom, in terms of their economies, were in an 
entirely different league vis-à-vis the old EU member states. Pertinent, though only 
partial, answers to the question of why the West opened to the East (the definitive 
resolution of which will have to await the work of future historians) include an interest 
on the part of EU-15 governments to further open up the CEE for economic integra-
tion, to control political developments in the region through the discipline imposed by 
conditionality, and thus to preclude undesirable neighborhood effects (ranging from 
drug trafficking to military conflict). Furthermore, a part of the old EU (notably the 
United Kingdom), by engaging in a determinate policy of “widening,” wanted to 
prevent the alternative of “deepening” within the EU-15—an alternative that was 
perceived as a menace by some of the old member states. Considerations and interests 
like these have obviously prevailed over the anticipated costs of eastern enlargement, 
the most important category of which consisted in the long-term obligation imposed 
on the EU-15 to transfer very substantial subsidies to the relatively backward econo-
                                                          
4 Let us suggest in passing that the second kind of “intrinsic” motivation is most likely to contribute to 
consolidation, while the first “opportunistic” one will last only as long as the rewards are considered 
adequate (and evaporate with the access completed) and the third will become weaker as state-
socialist realities disappear in the mist of the past. 
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mies of the CEE, which, in turn, implied a loss of such subsidies for the Mediterranean 
member states in particular. Eastern enlargement also meant the imposition of institu-
tional complexities on the institutional/organizational structure of the EU--
complexities that have become particularly acute after the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005. Eastern enlargement is bound to dramatically increase not so much the 
size as the diversity among economies within the new EU-25, and even more so in the 
EU-27. This diversity extends to culture, history, and language, and hence to the sense 
of European identity and solidarity. Yet, more importantly, it extends to the steep 
gradient in prosperity, indicating marked disparities. Per-capita income of EU-8 citi-
zens is just roughly a third of that of EU-15 citizens; with the eastern enlargement 
completed, the citizenry of the EU increased by 19.5 per cent, but total output grew by 
only 4.8 per cent (Alber and Merkel 2006: 15). 
Two distinct yet interacting developments have occurred: one is the enlargement 
of the EU with the economic impacts it has on both the new and the old member 
states; the other is the formation and reform of the social welfare systems in the new 
member states. Concerning the impact of eastern enlargement upon the development 
of welfare states in the CEE region, the anticipation of one axis of conflict stands out 
and this has framed political debate: namely, a clear-cut East-West cleavage of inter-
est. Given the labor cost differentials between the EU-15 and the EU-8, the widely 
feared (though often exaggerated—see below) dynamic is a massive inflow of labor 
from the latter into the former, and a reverse flow of capital, investment, and jobs. The 
latter effect is partly mediated through the phenomenon of tax competition, with the 
lower tax rate and “flat rate” tax (adopted, for example, by Slovakia) not only having 
the consequence of attracting western European investors, but also the alleged precon-
dition of net transfers flowing as subsidies from EU-15 donors into the EU-8 region, 
as it is only these transfers that allow for the “fiscal generosity” of CEE states towards 
investors in the first place. Many commentators from the continental western Euro-
pean Union member states fear that the dynamics of this (arguably somewhat dis-
torted) competition might undercut the fiscal viability of the EU-15 welfare states, 
given the fact that these are plagued anyway by high levels of unemployment and 
fiscal strain. 
But what about the emerging shape of the welfare state among the CEE transi-
tion societies, and the forces that determine the outcomes of reform? Three scenarios 
were distinguished in an influential paper by János Kovács (2002). 
First, and particularly so in the early 1990s, the prediction was widely shared by 
western social policy experts that welfare state transformations in post-communist 
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countries would undoubtedly emulate none of the continental European or Scandina-
vian models, but rather that of Thatcher’s United Kingdom or Reagan’s United States. 
The first prognosis thus anticipates the rise of a market-liberal model with means-
tested benefits and a moderate system of social insurance serving low-income clientele 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26); the middle and upper classes, in contrast, would have to 
rely upon health coverage and pension plans through private means as provided for in 
the second and third pillars5 of the social security system. If anything, as will be 
shown in some detail, this prediction can be rejected as premature and misguided—
misguided because the advice recommending social spending austerity had its source 
in institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, or mis-
guided because it was merely wishful thinking induced by the proponents of such 
advice (cf. Tomka 2004: 127-130). 
Diametrically opposed, as it were, is a second reading and projection of post-
communist welfare states. This scenario assumes that the long arm of the state-
socialist past will hinder any vigorous, consistent, and sustained reform effort. As a 
consequence, realities will best be described by stagnation and strong path dependency 
mediated through a mental and political legacy of state protectionism shared by mass 
electorates and political elites alike. As one of the earliest comparative analyses of 
post-communist welfare states concluded, the new political elites have been “remarka-
bly reluctant” to adopt any fundamental changes of the existing programs, for instance, 
in the area of old-age pensions (Götting 1998: 158). In this sense, Kovács speaks of a 
kind of welfare state that is part of “the few relics of the command economy with all 
its dominant features such as the over-centralization, waste, rationing, shortage, pater-
nalism, rent seeking and corruption” (Kovács, 2002: 192). 
The third position recognizes a mix consisting of the Bismarckian insurance 
model found in conservative corporatist regimes with additional public-private ele-
ments as a result of a number of a “… great variety of ‘small transformations’ …” 
(Kovács, 2002: 193) rather than the results of a great and consistent systemic change 
in any direction. These transformations are less the consequences of strict historical 
legacies or newly attained ideological attitudes, than they are of experimentation and 
the reaction to internal and external pressures. Welfare policies in the central and 
eastern European member states do not follow any consistent pattern that would con-
verge with one of the three or four familiar “welfare regimes” from western and south-
                                                          
5 Traditionally defined, the three pillars are (1) public pensions, (2) occupational pensions, and 
(3) personal pensions. Redefined, according to the World Bank scheme, the pillars are: (1) non-
contributory, basic pensions; (2) contributory, forced savings; and (3) contributory, voluntary sav-
ings. 
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ern Europe; nor do the CEE countries seem to have developed a model or “post-
socialist” regime of their own. If anything (or so we shall attempt to show), they can 
be described as a bricolage in which both “social democratic” and “conservative” 
elements play a role, while (contrary to widely shared expectations and in defiance of 
some external pressures) Anglo-Saxon patterns of welfare liberalism can hardly be 
detected. What prevails is an ideologically “faceless”, as well as arguably economi-
cally and politically unstable potpourri of policies (Tomka 2006: 132). Other than that, 
no uniform trend or pattern can be identified that would remain consistent across 
countries, time, or sectors of social policy and welfare state institutions. Analysts and 
commentators appear to largely agree that “Central and Eastern European welfare 
systems could be classified by mixed traditional characteristics of the different Euro-
pean models” (EU Commission 2003: 251). 
At the descriptive level, the obvious question is: Which of these three trajecto-
ries is most consistent with the evidence provided by the data on welfare state reform 
experienced in the countries of the region since the early 1990s? This question will be 
at the center of the account provided in the present paper. At the explanatory level, 
however, the even more challenging question is: What kinds of perceptions, choices, 
anticipations, and strategic reasoning were the driving forces for the elite actors in the 
CEE region when they adopted and implemented welfare state reforms. It is this latter 
question to which we now turn, briefly introducing the findings and arguments sug-
gested by Vanhuysse (2006), Orenstein (2000), and Cerami (2005, 2006). 
An essential feature of Bismarckian social security policies is that they are de-
signed to prevent the outbreak of distributive class conflict. They do so by installing 
three institutional features into social policy: (a) the selective provision of benefits to 
those segments of the population (i.e., the core working class) whose economic oppo-
sition would be most destructive to the orderly process of economic development, 
(b) the forging of inter-class alliances (e.g., in the form of social security funding 
being shared by employers and employees), and (c) the creation of institutional ar-
rangements that subdivide the clientele of social security into a number of administra-
tive categories (defined by region, gender, and type of benefits, as well as by such 
divisions as the employed vs. the unemployed, blue collar vs. white collar workers, 
ordinary pensioners vs. early retirees, workers in core or “heavy” industries vs. work-
ers engaged in the production of consumer goods and agriculture, etc.), thus shifting 
the focus of distributive conflict from a conflict between encompassing class coali-
tions to a conflict between status groups. Vanhuysse has persuasively argued in his 
recent book, Divide and Pacify (2006), that an analogous calculus of the preventive 
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management of conflict has been the guiding strategic objective in much of post-
communist social policy making. According to Vanhuysse, given the facts that (a) the 
working population of the former state socialist societies had never experienced any-
thing but employment security under the old system, (b) that it had acquired a mindset 
according to which both the level of employment and the level of real income is pri-
marily a matter of political decision making, (c) that with the transition to political 
democracy it enjoyed a substantial increase in its political resources after the demise 
of the monopolistic party dictatorship and, as a result, (d) that it had every reason to 
engage in vehement distributive struggles because of the high rate and often lengthy 
duration of unemployment due to the transformation crisis which generated widening 
economic disparities between the economic “winners” and the “losers” of that trans-
formation the potentially explosive mix of these factors was clearly understood by 
political elites, and the potential for disruptive distributive conflict anticipated. Re-
sponding to these threats, the post-communist elites engaged (largely) successfully in a 
“conservative” strategy of pacification through division, thus accomplishing the “un-
expected peacefulness” of the transition process. They managed to defuse the potential 
for protest through an administrative segregation of the population affected, thus 
rendering collective action for distributive conflict more difficult. The main categories 
in which the working class was divided are those of regular workers, regular pension-
ers, the unemployed and the “abnormal” (early retired) pensioners, with at least the 
latter two being strongly reliant on the informal economy. 
In a fine-grained analysis of the social reforms that occurred in the Vizégrad 
countries since the early 1990s, Cerami (2005, 2006) concludes that the pattern of 
reform “can be described as an ambiguous mix of differentiation and equalization of 
provisions” (2006: 27)—a pattern that can be alternatively described as a “recombi-
nant welfare state” or social policy “hybridization” which, in sharp contrast to the neo-
liberal precepts proclaimed in aftermath of the breakdown, remains to a large extent 
faithful to the Bismarckian tradition of the pre-communist era as well as to the egali-
tarian tradition of the state-socialist period (2006: 32). The absence of a social policy 
upheaval comparable to that which occurred over the economic and political reorgani-
zation of the post-communist societies is striking. Again and arguably, it is probably 
due to the perceived need to preserve social protection in order to fend off disruptive 
distributive conflicts (such as the miners’ strikes that occurred in Romania in 1998). 
Public debate among non-elites in the old member states, however, has focused 
on the question of labor migration and wage competition (the French nightmare of the 
“Polish plumber”). This is especially true for those countries which share borders with 
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the new member states, such as Austria and Germany. Given the various types of 
fears, hopes, and anticipations prevalent in the debate in the old and new member 
states, among elites and the masses alike, the question to be settled is this: How will 
enlargement affect social welfare in the European Union? That is, will the new mem-
ber states be the forerunners of “lean welfare”? Will migration driven by poor eco-
nomic and social performance in the new member states lead to “social dumping” and 
a “race to the bottom” in some or all of the EU-15 countries? As an overall conse-
quence, will enlargement reshape the social landscape of Europe? In addressing these 
issues, we start with a comparative analysis of features and trends in the institutional 
design of the welfare systems in the new member states. 
1. Social Welfare Systems of the Central and Eastern European Member 
States—Challenges and Developments 
We will begin by discussing basic indicators for the EU-8 economies. We proceed by 
addressing the most important reforms for the region in health care, pension plans, 
social exclusion, and the labor market. 
1.1 Basic Indicators 
The growth rates among new member states from the CEE exceed those of the EU-15 
significantly (see table 1). An important factor determining overall growth in the 
region was the export boom (e.g., exports rose in Hungary by 380per cent and in the 
Czech Republic by 280per cent in the ten years before accession) (Barysch, 2005: 2). 
This boom was fostered by the liberalization of trade among the EU-15 and the CEE. 
It was additionally fueled by high rates of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, 
according to a recent report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD), there are signs that some investors will shift their focus towards south-
eastern Europe, since privatization in the CEE countries is almost complete and thus 
attractive objects for investment there are becoming scarce6 (EBRD, 2005: 29, Vin-
centz, 2002). However, this is true only for top-down FDI vis-à-vis privatization. 
Bottom-up FDI, i.e., investment in start-up companies, is by all probability less af-
fected by further relocation of investment, especially if one takes the low corporate tax 
rates in the new member states into account (cf. ZEW and Ernst & Young 2004; see 
also section 1.2 below). 
                                                          
6 For the old member states, direct investment in the new member states accounts for a relatively 
small share of total corporate investment (e.g., in Germany, just one to two per cent in recent years) 
(Barysch, 2005: 2). In 2004, for instance, the old member states invested up to eleven times more in 
one another’s economies (ibid.). 
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Table 1: Basic indicators for the EU-8 and the EU-15, 2004 
 Indicators 
Country 
Population  
(in Millions) 
GDP 2003 
(in Billions 
of Euros) 
GDP  
per Capita 
at PPP,  
EU-25 = 100 
Real GDP 
Growth in per 
cent, Average 
for 2000-2004 
Inflation in per 
cent, Average 
for 2000-2004 
Current 
Account (in 
Billions of 
Dollars) 
Czech Republic  10.2 80.3 70 3.1 2.6 -5.6 
Estonia  1.3 8.1 51 7.2 3.5 -1.4 
Hungary  10.0 72.6 61 3.9 7.1 -8.8 
Latvia  2.3 9.9 43 7.5 3.2 -1.7 
Lithuania  3.4 16.3 48 6.7 0.5 -1.6 
Poland  38.2 185.2 47 3.1 4.3 -3.6 
Slovakia  5.4 29.0 52 4.1 7.7 -1.4 
Slovenia  2.0 24.9 79 3.4 6.8 -0.3 
EU-8  72.8 426.3 56 4.9 4.5 -24.4 
EU-15  383.5 9,373.5 109 2.0 2.0 21.8 
Source: Barysch (2005: 2); own calculations. 
The GDP per capita in the new member states reaches roughly 50 per cent of the GDP 
per capita of the EU-15 (Hönekopp et al., 2004: 1), and even the high growth rates of 
the past did not significantly diminish this gap. According to a projection by the Ger-
man Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) regarding the development 
of the GDP per capita in the new member states as a percentage of the average GDP 
per capita in the EU-15, the prosperity gap between the EU-15 and EU-8 will remain 
significant for a relatively long time into future, even if the more optimistic assump-
tions about EU-8 growth rates were to turn out true (see table 2). 
Turning from assumptions about the future to actual experiences in the recent 
past, we see that optimistic extrapolations seem to be well supported (see table 3). 
1.2 The Shadow Economy 
Another important economic phenomenon which needs to be taken into account if we 
want to assess the EU-8 scenario of economic development is the size of the shadow 
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economy7 as a percentage of the GDP. According to recent estimates, the shadow 
economy is, on average, twice as high in the Central and East European countries as it 
is in 21 OECD countries. The average size of the shadow economy in the new member 
states was almost 30 per cent of their official GDP in 2002/2003, as compared to an 
average of 16 per cent in 21 OECD countries for the same period (Schneider, 2004: 
30). The respective sizes of shadow economies vary considerably among CEE coun- 
 
                                                          
7 The shadow economy is defined as the total of market-based legal production of goods and services 
that are concealed from public authorities in order to avoid payment of taxes and social security con-
tributions, as well as to avoid compliance with regulatory standards (cf. Schneider, 2004: 4 f.) 
Table 2: Prognosis for the Development of the GDP per Capita in the EU-8 
in Relation to the Average GDP per Capita in the EU-15 
Country 2003 2010 2020 2030 
Assumed annual GDP growth of 2.5 per cent in the EU-8 and 1.5 per cent in the EU-15 
Average EU-8 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.66 
Estonia 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.58 
Latvia 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.54 
Lithuania 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.55 
Poland 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.55 
Slovakia 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.61 
Slovenia 0.71 0.76 0.83 0.92 
Czech Republic 0.63 0.67 0.74 0.82 
Hungary 0.56 0.60 0.66 0.73 
Assumed annual GDP growth of 3.5 per cent in EU-8 and 1.5 per cent in EU-15 
Average EU-8 0.51 0.58 0.71 0.86 
Estonia 0.45 0.51 0.62 0.76 
Latvia 0.42 0.48 0.58 0.70 
Lithuania 0.42 0.48 0.59 0.71 
Poland 0.42 0.49 0.59 0.72 
Slovakia 0.47 0.54 0.65 0.79 
Slovenia 0.71 0.81 0.98 1.19 
Czech Republic 0.63 0.72 0.88 1.07 
Hungary 0.56 0.64 0.78 0.94 
Source: Hönekopp et al., (2004: 5); own compilation, own calculations 
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tries. While those of Latvia and Estonia, for instance, reach almost 40 per cent of their 
respective GDPs, the shadow economies of Slovakia and the Czech Republic are much 
closer in size (at 20.2 per cent and 20.1 per cent, respectively, in 2002/2003; see table 
4) to those of the OECD average. The relative size of a given shadow economy re-
flects deficiencies in the administrative capacities of the respective new member 
states. 
Table 3: Real GDP Change, 1994-2003 
 Real GDP Change 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Austria 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.6 3.9 2.7 3.4 0.8 1.4 0.7 
Belgium 3.2 2.4 1.2 3.5 2.0 3.2 3.8 0.6 0.7 1.1 
Denmark 5.5 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.8 1.6 1.0 0.4 
Finland 3.9 3.4 3.9 6.3 5.0 3.4 5.1 1.1 2.3 1.9 
France 2.1 1.7 1.1 1.9 3.4 3.2 3.8 2.1 1.2 0.5 
Germany 2.3 1.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 0.8 0.2 -0.1 
Greece 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.6 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.0 3.9 4.3 
Ireland 5.8 9.9 8.1 11.1 8.6 11.3 10.1 6.2 6.9 1.4 
Italy 2.2 2.9 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 3.0 1.8 0.4 0.3 
Luxembourg 3.8 1.4 3.3 8.3 6.9 7.8 9.0 1.3 1.7 2.1 
Netherlands 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.5 1.2 0.2 -0.7 
Portugal 1.0 4.3 3.5 4.0 4.6 3.8 3.4 1.8 0.5 -1.2 
Spain 2.4 2.8 2.4 4.0 4.3 4.2 4.2 2.8 2.0 2.4 
Sweden 4.2 4.1 1.3 2.4 3.6 4.6 4.3 0.9 2.1 1.6 
United Kingdom 4.4 2.8 2.7 3.3 3.1 2.8 3.8 2.1 1.6 2.2 
Average EU-15 3.2 3.1 2.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.5 1.9 1.7 1.1 
Czech Republic 2.2 5.9 4.3 -0.8 -1.0 0.5 3.3 3.1 2.0 2.9 
Estonia -1.6 4.5 4.5 10.5 5.2 -0.1 7.8 6.4 7.2 5.1 
Hungary 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.5 2.9 
Latvia 2.2 -0.9 3.7 8.4 4.8 2.8 6.8 7.9 6.1 7.4 
Lithuania -9.8 5.2 4.7 7.0 7.3 -1.7 3.9 6.4 6.8 9.0 
Poland 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 
Slovakia 6.2 5.8 6.1 4.6 4.2 1.5 2.0 3.8 4.4 4.2 
Slovenia 5.3 4.1 3.6 4.8 3.6 5.6 3.9 2.7 3.4 2.3 
Average EU-8 1.6 4.1 4.3 5.7 4.2 2.1 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.7 
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2005; own calculations. 
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Economic activities which are part of a shadow economy are known to harm the real 
economy in many ways. Losses of tax revenues and social contributions, for instance, 
cause a decrease in the quality of public services and may ultimately lead to increased 
tax rates as a consequence, thus setting in motion a vicious circle. Moreover, no con-
tributions to social security or pension plans are made for persons employed in the 
shadow economy, thus these individuals could face poverty and reliance on public 
assistance benefits in old age. This condition applies, for example, to Poland and 
Hungary, where roughly 21 per cent of the respective labor forces are engaged in the 
shadow economy. 
1.3 Taxation and Social Expenditures 
In this section we compare corporate and personal income tax rates, value-added tax 
(VAT) rates, and payroll taxes for the EU-8 and the EU-15, in order to shed some light 
on the sources of fiscal revenues and their implications for social policies. 
Corporate taxes in the new member states are on average much lower than in the 
EU-15. For instance, Poland reduced its statutory tax rate in 2004 from 27 per cent to 
19 per cent; the Slovak Republic also did so, decreasing taxes from 25 per cent to 19 
per cent; the Czech Republic decreased taxes as well, from 31 per cent to 28 per cent. 
In addition, the new member states grant considerable tax incentives to attract foreign 
Table 4: Size of the Shadow Economy in New Member States, 1999-2003 
 Shadow Economy (in percentage of official GDP) 
Country 1999-2000 2001-2002 2002-2003 
Czech Republic  19.1 19.6 20.1 
Estonia  38.4 39.2 40.1 
Hungary  25.1 25.7 26.2 
Latvia  39.9 40.7 41.3 
Lithuania  30.3 31.4 32.6 
Poland  27.6 28.2 28.9 
Slovakia  18.9 19.3 20.2 
Slovenia  27.1 28.3 29.4 
Average 28.3 29.0 29.9 
Germany 16.0 16.3 16.8 
Source: Schneider, (2004: 26, 30); own compilation and calculations. 
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investors.8 Average corporate taxes are not only substantially lower than those levied 
in EU-15, there is also a great deal of variation among EU-8 states, indicating an 
intense corporate tax-rate competition unfolding among them. 
As to the taxation of personal income, the Baltic States and Slovakia imple-
mented a flat income tax rate, with rates ranging between 19 per cent in Slovakia and 
33 per cent in Lithuania. This had the effect of relieving the middle class from the 
distributive effects of tax progression. 
Concerning the welfare-related expenditure side of the national budget, EU-8 
levels of social spending are much lower than those to be found in the EU-15 (see 
table 5). This finding is in line with the well-known tendency for welfare budgets to 
increase/decrease in direct proportion to per-capita GDPs . While the new EU member 
states from the CEE region spend on average 19 per cent of their GDP on social wel-
fare, the old member states reach a share of about 28 per cent. The greatest single 
factor accounting for this gap is under-spending by the EU-8 on health care, as com-
pared to EU-15 average expenditures for the same. (EU Commission 2006: 102). 
Not only the level of social expenditures, but also the source of financing differs 
somewhat between the EU-8 and the EU-15. Concerning the latter, we can observe a 
broad trend towards shifting contributory systems in the direction of a greater role 
being played by general tax revenues in financing social welfare insurance and other 
social expenditures. A similar trend can be observed in the emerging EU-8 welfare 
states, although (and perhaps due to the tradition inherited from the “Bismarckian” 
logic of state socialism and its social welfare policies) the shift towards greater financ-
ing through tax revenues appears to be somewhat delayed in the CEE region. Total 
labor costs in Central and Eastern Europe still consist, to a significant extent, of non-
wage expenditures (e.g., social insurance contributions). For instance, in Poland social 
security contributions amount to 47 per cent of labor costs, and in Slovakia to more 
than 50 per cent, both countries surpassing even German and Italian expenditure rates. 
Thus, the new EU member states from the CEE apparently still rely more on contribu-
tory financing of social security than is the case for the average EU-15 member state 
(see table 6). However, the contribution rate determined by government often does not 
fully cover statutory expenses, so that deficits must be financed out of general tax 
revenues. The legacies of state socialism mean that the employers’ share in contribu-
tions is usually higher than that of the employees (see table 6). 
                                                          
8 For an overview on tax incentives in the new member states, see ZEW and Ernst & Young, 2004: 
31-35. 
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Table 5: Social Expenditures1 (as Per Cent of GDP) for the EU-15, EU-8, and 
EU-23 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Belgium  28.1 28.6 27.9 27.6 27.3 26.9 27.5 27.8 
Danmark  32.2 31.4 30.4 30.2 30.0 29.2 29.4 30.0 
Germany 28.9 30.0 29.5 29.3 29.6 29.6 29.8 30.5 
Finland  31.7 31.6 29.2 27.2 26.8 25.5 25.7 26.4 
France  30.7 31.0 30.8 30.5 30.2 29.8 30.0 30.6 
Greece  22.3 22.9 23.3 24.2 25.5 26.3 27.1 26.6 
United Kingdom  28.2 28.1 27.5 26.9 26.5 27.1 27.6 27.6 
Ireland  18.9 17.8 16.6 15.4 14.7 14.3 15.3 16.0 
Italy 24.8 24.8 25.5 25 25.2 25.2 25.6 26.1 
Luxemburg  23.7 24.1 22.8 21.7 21.7 20.3 21.3 22.7 
Netherlands  30.9 30.1 29.4 28.4 28 27.4 27.5 28.5 
Austria 28.9 28.8 28.8 28.5 28.9 28.4 28.6 29.1 
Portugal  22.1 21.2 21.4 22.1 22.6 23.0 24.0 25.4 
Sweden  34.6 33.8 32.9 32.2 31.8 30.8 31.4 32.5 
Spain  22.1 21.9 21.2 20.6 20.3 20.2 20.1 20.2 
Estonia  – – – – – 15.1 14.3 – 
Latvia  – – – – – 15.3 14.3 – 
Lithuania  – – – – – 16.2 15.2 – 
Poland  – – – – – 20.7 22.12 – 
Slovakia  18.7 19.8 20 20.2 20.2 19.5 19.1 19.2 
Slovenia – 24.4 24.8 25.0 25.0 25.2 25.5 25.4 
Czech Republic 17.0 17.3 18.3 18.3 19.1 19.3 19.2 19.9 
Hungary  – – – – 20.7 19.8 19.8 20.9 
EU-25 – – – – – 27.0 27.3 – 
EU-15 28.2 28.4 28.0 27.5 27.4 27.3 27.6 28.0 
EU-8 – – – – – 18.9 18.7 21.4 
1 Social expenditures as a percentage of the GDP include health, disability, old age, survivor dependent compensation, family benefits, 
unemployment, housing and public assistance. 
2 According to Walwei (2004: 3) the Polish share of social expenditure as per cent of GDP was almost 30 per cent. 
Source: Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (2005); own calculations. 
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Table 6: Social Insurance Contribution Rates of Employers and Employees, 
2002 (in Per Cent) 
Country 
Pensions— 
Old Age, Survivor, 
and Disability 
Health Unemployment 
Other— 
Maternity, Illness, 
Occupational 
Diseases 
Total 
Total (Employer/Employee), Percentages of Wages Before Taxes 
Czech 
Republic 
26  
19.5 + 6.5) 
13.5 
(9 + 4.5) 
3.6 
(3.2 + 0.4) 
4.4 
(3.3 + 1.1) 47.5 
Estonia  20 (employer)1 
13 
(employer)2 
1.5 
(0.5 + 1) – 34.5 
Hungary  26 (18 + 8) 
14 
(11 + 3)3 
4.5 
(3 + 1.5) – 44.5 
Latvia  30.86 general taxes 1.9 2.33 35.094 
Lithuania  25 (22.5 + 2.5) 
3.0 
(employer)5 1.5 
4.5 
(4 + 0,5) 34 
Poland 32.52 (16.26 + 16.26) 
7.75 
(employee) 
2.45 
(employer) 
4.07 
(1.62 + 2.45) 46.79 
Slovakia  28  (21.6 + 6.4) 
14 
(10 + 4) 
3.75 
(2.75 + 1) 
4.8 
(3.4 + 1.4)6 50.55 
Slovenia  24.35 (8.85 + 15.5) 
12.92 
(6.56 + 6.36) 
0.2  
(0.06 + 0.14) 
0.73 
(0.63 + 0.1) 38.2 
1 Contributions to funded pension scheme as of 1 July 2002: plus 2 per cent of the wage.  
2 Including illness cash benefits.  
3 The employer pays an additional lump sum of HUF 4500 (approximately 18 euros) per month to the Health Insurance Fund.  
4 Nine per cent of the overall contribution rate is paid by the employee.  
5 No direct employees contribution, but 30 per cent of the income tax of the employee are transferred to health insurance.  
6 The employer pays for occupational risk insurance additionally between 0.2 and 1.2 per cent.  
Source: European Commission (2003: 28), own compilation. 
To some extent, the EU-8 do seem to stick to the Bismarckian model, regarding the 
mode of financing the welfare state, which relies on social security contributions 
shared between employers and employees, and levied against wages, with general tax 
revenues playing only a marginal role. However, the new member states also suffer 
from poor labor market performance which is due, in part, to the high non-wage costs 
of employment (cf. Knogler, 2002). High non-wage labor costs weaken the already 
imbalanced labor market and shrink the contribution base as a result of increasing 
incentive to participate in the shadow economy. Therefore, there seems to be at best, 
only very limited room to increase revenues by increasing contribution rates. 
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2. Social Protection Systems in the Central and East European Member 
States9 
In the following sections we try to identify, in some detail, similarities and differences 
in the design of social welfare systems in the EU-8. In order to achieve a clearer pic-
ture of scope, source, and level of social security in the EU-8, we review the key fea-
tures of health care, the pension system, measures against social exclusion and pov-
erty, and unemployment insurance and labor market policy. On the basis of this ac-
count we shall further discuss the nature and specificity of EU-8 welfare states.  
2.1 Health Care 
In the former state socialist EU-member countries, health care was state controlled and 
revenues were collected predominantly from state-owned companies. Private contribu-
tions existed (if they existed at all) in the form of informal “bribes” that were needed 
to jump the queue.10 The entitlement to free health care in the CEE was institutional-
ized as a right of citizenship. 
The challenges that post-communist governments had to cope with pertained to 
the reorganization of health services and of the mode of financing them. These tasks 
had to be solved in the context of persistent expectations and demands from a public 
which continues to regard, in line with state-socialist patterns, the state as provider 
(rather than mere regulator) of health care (cf. Kornai/Eggleston, 2001). Although the 
organization of health care diverges from case to case, all of the new EU member 
states from the CEE have adopted a contributory (“Bismarckian”) model of financing 
parts of health expenses (see table 7). The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slova-
kia, Slovenia, Latvia, and Lithuania, roughly following the German pattern, introduced 
a system of self-governing, state-regulated regional health insurance funds in the first 
half of the 1990s, followed by Poland in the late-1990s. The mode of financing health 
services differs among the new EU member states from the CEE: Latvia and Poland 
finance a large portion of health expenses through taxation, while the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia rely mostly on contributions. 
Overall health care expenditures as a percentage of the GDP range from 5.9 per cent in 
Latvia to 8.9 per cent in Slovenia (data for the year 2000, European Commission, 
                                                          
9 The sections 2.1  to 2.3 rely on the  European Commission (2004) report on social protection sys-
tems in the candidate countries for basic information.  
10 The latter remained a prominent feature in the new member states (Kovács, 2002, Dietrich, 2003: 
113). 
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2004: 122) and is just over one half of the relative size of health expenditures in the 
EU-15. (European Commission, 2004: 224) 
Table 7: Shift toward the Bismarck Model of Social Health Insurance (SHI) 
Country  Year SHI Law Passed  
Year Contribution 
Collection Began  
Autonomy of 
Health Insurance 
Fund(s)1 
Contributions and 
Benefits Set by the 
Government  
Czech Republic  1990 1993 Yes No 
Estonia  1991 1992 Yes Yes 
Hungary  1991 1991 No Yes 
Latvia  1993 1993 Yes No 
Lithuania  1991 1991 No Yes 
Poland  1997 1999 Yes No 
Slovakia  1994 1994 Yes N/A 
Slovenia  1992 1992 Yes Yes 
1 Autonomy is defined as health insurance funds “… that are administered by an agency other than the government itself. This could be 
through a national health insurance fund which would be in charge of setting and collecting and distributing funds” (European 
Commission, 2004: 98). 
Source: European Commission, 2004: 97. 
Governments of the EU-8 approached the problem of reorganizing and financing 
health care by cutting or privatizing hospital capacities. Also, administrative decen-
tralization of health service facilities to local and non-profit agencies was an important 
instrument for reforming primary and secondary health care. As a consequence of the 
downsizing of medical capacities, the provision of services became precarious in some 
regions. In the EU-15 on average, 96 per cent of the citizens need less than one hour to 
reach a hospital, while this is true for only 87 per cent of the CEE citizenry (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2004:26 f.). 
Health care developments can roughly be summarized as follows. Financing ser-
vices (and thus the demand side of the health market) has largely remained a matter of 
mandatory contributions and taxes, while the actual provision of services (i.e., the 
supply side) is partly assigned to private and decentralized actors. User fees are com-
mon for prescription drugs, dental care, and some rehabilitation services. Private 
health insurance was introduced in some countries (Estonia, Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic), but plays only a minor role in the overall financing of health care (Dietrich, 
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2003: 99). In addition, all countries introduced mechanisms to enhance the efficiency 
and control the quality of medical services supplied.  
Eastern enlargement has had a significant impact upon the health systems in the 
EU-8, since it facilitates migration (cf. EU Commission 2003: 241). In principle, both 
supply-side actors (e.g., medical doctors) and demand-side actors (patients and their 
health funds) can seek advantages by crossing member states’ borders. To a limited 
extent, patients who are nationals of new member states are permitted to undergo 
treatment abroad; they may choose to do so because of the limited availability and/or 
poor quality of medical treatment available at home. As their health funds will have to 
cover medical costs abroad, these must increase substantially. Conversely, some of the 
EU-8 member states are expected to profit from the competitively priced health ser-
vices (such as spa treatments) that they can provide to patients from other EU coun-
tries. From the supply-side perspective, there are strong incentives for medical profes-
sionals from the new member states to relocate to older ones—in particular, higher 
status and income—assuming that professional qualifications and training curricula 
will be further harmonized throughout the EU. In turn, this development, could trigger 
an outflow of skills and a “brain drain” among medical professionals in their respec-
tive countries of origin . 
2.2 Social Exclusion and Poverty 
After the political transformation following the collapse of the old regime in 1989, the 
eight new EU members from the CEE faced the new challenge of having to fight 
poverty and social exclusion, which resulted from the steep increase in income ine-
quality and the poor labor market performance that accompanied the economic transi-
tion from a social market to a private market economy. Although not absent under the 
old regime, poverty was largely a condition experienced by those who were outside of 
employment, i.e., the pensioners, while (open) unemployment was a virtually un-
known phenomenon. “… [I]n former socialist countries poverty issues were not ex-
plicitly on the political agenda” (EU Commission, 2004: 243). 
The picture changed dramatically in the early 1990s when a large number of 
workers lost their jobs, real wage levels decreased under the impact of high inflation 
rates, and shrinking state-provided transfers and services failed to cope with the kinds 
and scopes of newly emerging risks; as a consequence, “poverty became widespread” 
(ibid.). The early retirement age that was characteristic for state socialist regimes 
inflated the ranks of pensioners in need of transfers, and the relatively low life-
expectancy of men aggravated the problem of financing survivors’ pensions, while 
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company-operated social services and facilities disappeared with the companies or, at 
any rate, the companies’ ability to provide them. States and state-operated companies 
became unable to care for dependent and highly vulnerable segments of the population 
such as the elderly, disabled, orphaned or abandoned children, and the residents of 
backward, rural areas; vulnerability and marginalization were also tied to the condi-
tions of juvenile delinquency, teenage pregnancy, substance abuse, and prostitution, as 
well as blatant forms of gender discrimination against women. (ibid.: 245) Women 
were more strongly affected than men by the new labor market dynamics of rising 
unemployment, since a comparatively high share of the female labor force was em-
ployed in agriculture in rural areas where wages tended to be much lower than in 
urban areas. Their male counterparts tended to migrate to other areas and usually 
better paid occupations. 
All of these developments exacerbated the pressures that had to be dealt with by 
families who became the ultimate safety net by default. There are also strong indica-
tions that the state socialist system with its paternalistic and authoritarian features had 
discouraged the rise of “social capital” and other civil society virtues of caring locally 
for the rights and well-being of fellow citizens, be it within or outside of religious 
charities and need-based services, all of which are arguably the most elementary forms 
of solidarity in social life (cf. Howard 2003). At the same time, political democratiza-
tion made the issue of poverty and the policies to alleviate it increasingly salient items 
on the political agenda. In addition, in some countries the issue of poverty merged 
with the issue of civil and social rights of minorities, most importantly, the Roma. In 
Hungary, for instance, this ethnic group made up one-third of the long-term poor, 
constituting only about five or six per cent of the overall population. In Slovakia, 80 
per cent of the Roma population had to rely on public assistance and disability bene-
fits. 
However, early recognition of the existence of poverty issues was rare in the 
CEE countries, with the notable exceptions of the Czech Republic and Slovenia. These 
two countries responded timely to the new challenge of poverty in the beginning of 
early-1990s while, in other countries of the region, poverty and the poor emerged as a 
policy issue only in the latter half of that decade. This delay in poverty-related policy 
formation had various causes such as the political priority accorded to pension and 
unemployment reforms, the poor representational resources and “voice” of the groups 
affected by poverty, as well as the widespread belief that poverty is a natural yet tran-
sitory side-effect of economic transformation. Not only was poverty for some time 
disregarded by policy makers, it was also hidden from observation by the failure of 
Claus Offe and Susanne Fuchs • Welfare State Formation in the Enlarged European Union 21
 
 
official statistics to take account of the phenomenon. If such accounting occurred at 
all, it was performed by international actors such as the World Bank, ILO, and the 
UNDP (European Commission, 2004: 176 f.). The Polish government began to re-
spond in the mid-1990s to a poverty report that was submitted by the World Bank; 
similar responses occurred in Estonia in 1999 and Latvia in 1998. It was only in the 
course of the accession process that preceded actual enlargement that poverty and 
social exclusion gained attention due to the EU’s emphasis on “fighting exclusion” 
and the precondition that new member states had to comply with EU standards and 
policies. Yet the risk of workers becoming part of the “working poor” still appears to 
be considerably higher among the EU-8 than it is in the EU-15. 
The institutional means through which the problem of poverty has been ad-
dressed in the CEE region are family and child benefits, and means-tested public 
assistance. In addition, there are housing subsidies for the poor (Slovenia, Poland) and 
some rudimentary NGO-operated charitable services and support. As is the case else-
where, public assistance operates on the basis of an income-level “poverty line,” be-
low which individuals and families are entitled to (cash, in-kind, or service) benefits 
that will supposedly help to sufficiently narrow or close the gap. Family and child 
benefits as well as public assistance are tax-financed and administered on the local 
level in all countries. Coverage varies but seems nevertheless not quite sufficient. 
To summarize, it seems to be fair to say that social exclusion and poverty are is-
sues that were measured, recognized, and addressed only belatedly (in anticipation of 
accession) in most of the new member states. Poverty in the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries is a complex result of the conditions of unemployment, poor health, 
ethnicity, the breakdown of the safety net of the former state socialist regime, and 
administrative and financial deficiencies that prevent anti-poverty schemes from work-
ing effectively. Again, no general institutional pattern can be identified across coun-
tries and across time, with the only valid generalization being the dysfunction and 
fiscal constraints which stand in the way of adequate and effective (including preven-
tative) policy measures to alleviate poverty and exclusion.  
2.3 Pensions 
Under the old regime, CEE countries relied on a centralized state-provided pension 
system. In general, the dominant pension scheme consisted of two tiers, with the first 
tier being the mandatory public scheme and the second tier being quasi-mandatory (in 
countries with low flat-rate benefits) or voluntary (in countries with more generous 
benefits). In addition, the retirement age was (and still is) considerably lower in CEE 
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states (60 years or younger) than in the older member states. Even after raising the 
retirement age during the last decade, none of the new member states has so far 
reached the EU-15 standard mandating a 65-year threshold as the statutory retirement 
age (see table 8). 
Table 8: Changes in Statutory Retirement Age 
Change as an Element of Pension Reform  
Pre-Reform Retirement Age  
Final Retirement Age (Year  
When This Will Be Realized)  
Country Men  Women  Year of Change Men  Women  
Czech Republic  60 53-571 1996 62 (2006) 57-61 (2006) 
Estonia  60 55 1994 63 (2007) 60 (2016) 
Hungary  60 55 1998 62 (2001) 62 (2009) 
Latvia  60 55 1995 62 (2003) 62 (2008) 
Lithuania  60 55 1999 62.5 (2003) 60 (2006) 
Poland  65 60 19993 – – 
Slovakia  60 53-571 no change – – 
Slovenia  60 (582) 55 (532) 1999 63 (582) (2000) 61 (582) (2000) 
1 Retirement age depends on number of children (57: childless; 56: 1 child; 55: 2 children; 54: 3 children. 
2 Earliest possible retirement with 40 years of service (for men) or 35 years (for women; after the reform in 1999, 38 years). 
3 Statutory retirement age in principle unchanged, but before 1999 there were many exceptions (lower retirement ages for specific 
groups).  
Source: European Commission, 2004: 67, own compilation. 
Moreover, we must keep in mind that the actual average retirement age is even lower 
than the statutory retirement age. This is due to early retirement resulting from pre-
carious health conditions or disability of elderly employees, and the high rates of 
unemployment among older workers. As is the case in some western European coun-
tries, the pension system is effectively used (through arrangements facilitating “ab-
normal” retirement, as Vanhuysse (2006) calls it) to conceal unemployment, and 
particularly so where effective unemployment insurance is not in place. This “solu-
tion,” however, comes at a price: it consists in vast fiscal imbalances between the 
revenues which the pension system extracts from contributors and the payments which 
it makes to retired recipients. What this imbalance seems to call for, according to the 
logic of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, is a raising of the statutory retirement age in 
the public pensions system (“first pillar”)—a move, however, which is precluded, 
Claus Offe and Susanne Fuchs • Welfare State Formation in the Enlarged European Union 23
 
 
because this would only increase the gap between the nominal and the actual retire-
ment ages, given the generally unfavorable labor market situation. As a way out of this 
dilemma, the burden of providing income to the elderly has partly been shifted to a 
funded system with mandatory elements, be it in the form of occupational pensions 
(“second pillar”) or private savings (“third pillar”). Thus all countries have devised 
multi-tiered models, whereby the first tier is the basic public pension, the second 
consists in supplementary funding (usually provided by public-private or private 
schemes, e.g., by employers), and the third consists in additional funding through 
private savings.  
The new member states differ with regard to the time and extent of the introduc-
tion of mandatory elements in their respective pension schemes. Only Latvia, Hun-
gary, Poland and Estonia (and another candidate country, Bulgaria) have implemented 
mandatory systems since the late-1990s. Slovakia implemented pension reforms only 
as of January 2005. Slovakian workers can choose to remain entirely in the PAYG 
system or to commit a part of their pension savings to investment funds (Tupy, 2006). 
Other countries like Slovenia and the Czech Republic decided to reform their 
first pillar by raising retirement ages and strengthening the contribution-benefits link. 
The Czech Republic split the first tier into two components: the first includes a citi-
zenship-based flat rate pension and is complemented by the second, a professional 
status and earnings-related pension scheme. In addition, a voluntary supplementary 
pension scheme is available that is run by joint stock companies. (Cerami, 2005: 76 f.). 
Slovenia introduced a comparable system with a mandatory first pillar scheme (pay-
as-you-go), based on citizenship, which is universal in scope and coverage (e.g., con-
tributions for unemployment compensation are also made by the state). Its second 
pillar is based on an income differentiation scheme managed by the state through the 
Institute of Pension and Disability Insurance of Slovenia (ibid.: 84). Thus Slovenia 
remained closest to the universal and redistributive pension scheme which was typical 
for the communist regimes. This can be explained as a result of having strong unions 
which succeeded, for instance, in blocking influence and staving off pressure from the 
World Bank or the IMF. None of the new member states introduced a privately man-
aged first pillar; thus the Latin American (Chile) model does not seem to have been 
considered a real option. 
The collectivist concept of solidarity that was institutionalized in the centralized 
and universalized system of pensions under state socialism thus gave way to a pluralist 
and vastly more complex system in which PAYG and funds, and mandatory and vol-
untary elements play a role. The new concept of solidarity is less demanding in terms 
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of interpersonal redistribution. What it does emphasize, instead, is a kind of longitudi-
nal solidarity, or the solidarity of present individuals (accumulating savings out of 
current incomes) with their future selves (receiving capital yields in proportion to 
those savings). In order for this liberal (as opposed to its state socialist counterpart) 
notion of solidarity and responsibility to become operative, strong institutional under-
pinnings are needed, for instance, in the form of a well-functioning and adequately 
regulated banking system which guarantees a link between present funds and future 
benefits. Similarly, and as far as the remaining public PAYG system is maintained, its 
adequate operation depends upon the availability of the administrative capacity that is 
needed to force (foremostly) employers to do their duty and to actually make the 
mandatory social security contributions that are expected of them. “Contribution eva-
sion” by employers has reportedly become a widespread phenomenon in the region (a 
“common and fashionable sport”). Similarly, workers violate norms of solidarity (be it 
solidarity with fellow workers or be it solidarity with their own future selves) by draw-
ing incomes from the shadow economy, the illegal economy, or by underreporting 
their wages (European Commission 2003: 237 f.). 
The problems that policymakers in post-socialist countries must deal with are 
not just caused by labor market, financial, and demographic conditions. As if that were 
not already enough of a burden, these problems are also caused by widespread anti-
solidarity patterns such as future-discounting or other-disregarding “attitudes of disre-
gard”. Unsurprisingly from a sociological point of view, the generalization may not 
have been entirely over-simplified that, as soon as the authoritarian centralist lid was 
lifted off the pot of state socialist society, the transition process was marked by symp-
toms of widespread opportunism, “short-termism,” and the corrosion of loyalties to 
institutions that are the indispensable underpinnings of any version of solidarity. 
Again, as in health care, none of the new EU member states has rejected its gen-
eral responsibility for social security. All provide basic coverage which is comple-
mented by a second and third pillar, with the former often provided by public-private 
or private schemes and the latter consisting of private savings. However, poverty in 
old age is a problem in many of the new member states. Due to an absence of indexing 
in the CEE region, pensions decreased dramatically in value and could fall well below 
subsistence level. Additional funding schemes like the National Pension in Estonia 
have corrected this problem at least partly, while other countries have granted a flat-
rate pension below minimum income levels. Pensioners without substantial savings, 
other sources of income, or family support thus find it hard to make a living.  
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2.4 Labor Market Performance and Unemployment 
All of the transition economies faced a severe recession in the beginning of the 1990s. 
The bottom was reached for most of them in 1992/93, but since then the CEE coun-
tries have experienced higher average growth rates than the EU-15. However, overall 
economic performance differs considerably among CEE states.  
As discussed in section 1.1, there is little reason to expect current growth rates to 
persist in the medium-term future. But even the high growth rates of the mid-nineties 
did not lead to anything approaching “full” employment. Labor market performance 
varies among the new member states, but unemployment rates are on average higher 
than those for the EU-15 (with the notable exceptions of Slovenia, the Czech Repub-
lic, and Hungary; see table 9). Labor market participation rates, especially for the 
young and the elderly, are low, and long-term unemployment is a severe problem (see 
table 9). High unemployment rates among young people reached dramatic dimensions 
in some countries—almost a third of the 15- to 25-year-olds in CEE countries are 
jobless (in Poland the level is 40 per cent). Many in this category lack vocational skills 
and working experience, and thus constitute a pool of largely “unemployable” labor. 
(Barysch, 2005: 10). The labor market situation is further aggravated by migration 
especially that of highly skilled labor (“brain drain”). Depending on the volume of 
outward migration, it may well result in a substantial net loss of human capital in the 
new member states. Thus, migration is likely to be less of a problem for target coun-
tries than for the countries from which it originates. In addition, low birth rates and 
ageing societies lead to a shrinking labor force. Demographic change will hit the CEE 
countries with a time lag, since birth rates were on average higher than in the EU-15 
until the 1980s. (ibid.: 3 f.) The massive material incentives for East-West labor mi-
gration (including “commuter migration”) will be further counterbalanced by two 
constraints: one is the right of EU-15 member states to delay full labor mobility by up 
to seven years after accession; the other is the presence of linguistic barriers in a 
Europe with some twenty official languages. 
  
 
Table 9: Key Labor Market Indicators for the New Member States, 2003 
Employment by Type of Contract 
(Percentage of Employed Labor Force) Labor Market Participation Rate 
(Percentage of Population) 
Unemployment Rate 
(ILO; Percentage of Labor Force) 
Comparative Employment 
Structure by Sector (Percentage 
of Employed Labor Force) Self-Employed1   
Countries 
Total 
(15-64 
Years) 
Youth 
(15-24 
Years) 
25- 54 
Years 
Elderly 
(55-64 
Years) 
Woman 
(15-64 
Years) Total 
Youth 
(15-24 
Yrs) Women 
Long-
Term 
Unem-
ployed 
Service 
Sector Industry 
Agricul-
ture Total 
Without 
Agricul-
ture Part-Time 
Limited 
Contracts 
Average, 
new 
member 
states 
59.9 27.2 77.0 36.0 54.8 – – – – – – – 13.1 8.8 – – 
Estonia 62.9 29.3 77.8 52.3 59.0 10.1 22.9 10.0 4.6 61.5 32.3 6.1 8.1 6.4 8.5 2.5 
Latvia 61.8 31.5 77.7 44.1 57.9 10.5 17.6 10.7 4.3 60.8 25.8 13.4 9.5 5.0 10.3 11.1 
Lithuania 61.1 22.5 78.9 44.7 58.4 12.7 27.2 13.3 6.1 54.1 28.0 17.8 17.1 6.2 9.6 7.2 
Poland 51.2 21.2 67.5 26.9 46.0 19.2 41.1 20.0 10.7 53.0 28.6 18.4 21.7 9.9 10.5 19.4 
Slovakia 57.7 27.4 76.0 24.6 52.2 17.1 32.9 17.4 11.1 61.5 34.1 4.4 9.4 9.0 2.4 4.9 
Slovenia 62.6 29.1 82.5 23.5 57.6 6.5 15.9 7.1 3.4 52.3 36.9 10.9 9.8 6.6 6.2 13.7 
Czech 
Republic 64.7 30.0 81.7 42.3 56.3 7.8 18.6 9.9 3.8 56.1 39.4 4.5 16.7 15.9 5.0 9.2 
Hungary 57.0 26.8 73.7 28.9 50.9 5.8 13.1 5.5 2.4 62.3 31.9 5.8 12.8 11.2 4.4 7.5 
Average 
EU-15 64.4 39.9 77.2 41.7 56.0 8.1 15.6 9.0 3.3 71.0 25.0 4.0 14.2
2 12.12 18.6 12.8 
EU-15 
maximum 
75.1 
(DK) 
67.9 
(NL) 
84.5 
(A) 
68.6 
(S) 
71.5 
(S) 
11.3 
(E) 
27.0 
(I) 15.9 
5.1 
(GR) 
80.0 
(UK) 
33.8 
(P) 
16.1 
(GR) 
32.4 
(GR) 
21.5 
(GR) 
45.0 
(NL) 
30.6 
(E) 
Germany 65.0 44.5 78.1 39.5 59.0 9.6 10.1 9.2 4.6 70.3 27.2 2.4 10.4 9.6 22.3 12.2 
EU-15 
minimum 
56.1 
(I) 
25.2 
(I) 
70.7 
(I) 
28.1 
(B) 
42.7 
(I) 
3.7 
(L) 
6.8 
(NL) 4.0 
0.9 
(L) 
53.8 
(P) 
19.0 
(UK) 
0.9 
(UK) 
8.4 
(DK) 
6.7 
(DK) 
4.3 
(GR) 
4.5 
(L) 
1 Labor force total.  
2 Without NL. 
Source: Hönekopp (2005: 3); own calculations and compilation. 
Claus Offe and Susanne Fuchs • Welfare State Formation in the Enlarged European Union 27
 
 
The new member states achieved increasing productivity levels at the expense of jobs 
and the structure of their respective labor markets which are still dominated by indus-
try and agriculture, and characterized by a largely underdeveloped service sector. 
These countries face a problem that is well known in the old member states, namely, 
jobless growth (ibid.).11 Foreign investment in the mass-production sector cannot cure 
CEE labor markets in the long run (nor is this the goal of foreign investors), and their 
future as low-cost production countries is contested by Asian markets. As a conse-
quence of these factors, the new EU member countries face difficulties similar to those 
plaguing the older member states, albeit on a larger scale. 
Since 2001, a slight improvement in labor market performance in the CEE states 
can be observed. However, since growth rates are predicted to decrease and more 
restrictive economic policies are expected to be applied in the new member states, a 
stable and substantial recovery of the labor markets in the countries under study ap-
pears unlikely (cf. Knogler, 2002). As a consequence, not a single country in the CEE 
region fulfills any of the three targets set by the Lisbon Strategy12 as part of its overall 
aim to achieve “full” employment and combat social exclusion within the EU: that is, 
having 70 per cent of the population aged 15 to 64 years, 50 per cent of the elderly 
(aged 55+) and 60 per cent of women economically active (see table 9). 
As unemployment was (at least officially) virtually unknown under the commu-
nist regimes, institutions that deal with this feature of capitalist democracies had to be 
built from scratch. Institutional designs of provisions for the unemployed vary consid-
erably among the new member states. These designs range from an unemployment 
scheme with flat-rate benefits framed into a comprehensive social security system 
such as in Latvia’s, over a generous13 contributory and earnings-related unemployment 
insurance system such as Hungary’s, to a tax-financed flat-rate system with strict 
entitlement rules such as that in Estonia (up to 2002), which comes closer to a form of 
public assistance. A special case is the Czech Republic: Here a generous status-related 
                                                          
11 The ILO World Employment Report, 2004-2005 states: “The deep transitional crisis and subsequent 
large structural changes in these economies greatly affected the labor markets of this region. Firms 
closed, many people lost their jobs, and only the most productive businesses survived. On the whole, 
the growth rates of output and productivity turned negative or at best remained modestly positive. 
Hence the loss of jobs during the previous decade was not the result of productivity growth but of 
stagnating productivity levels during the communist era” (ILO, 2005: 91). 
12 A ten-year program (2000-2010) adopted by the European Council during the March 2000 meeting 
of European heads of state in Lisbon (the Lisbon Summit), which established an ambitious frame-
work of socio-economic and structural reform, designed among other things to increase social inclu-
sion, revitalize growth and enhance sustainable development within the European Union. 
13 Although cuts and active employment measures were implemented during the Orbán government, 
1998-2002, and abandoned again by the reelected post-communist government. 
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unemployment scheme is complemented by a policy of active employment promotion. 
The duration of entitlement is short (six months) and, after that period has elapsed, 
unemployment benefits are replaced by unemployment assistance which is below the 
level of minimum subsistence. Employers are legally forced to register job vacancies 
within five days. Seventy-seven district labor offices administer retraining and qualifi-
cation schemes, and other activating measures. The Slovakian case is similar, although 
employment policies are more centralized than in the Czech Republic. 
Poland changed its unemployment policies after 1994. Before 1994 a contribu-
tory, universal, low-level flat-rate system was implemented, which was closer to pub-
lic assistance than to unemployment insurance. After 1994, the criteria for eligibility 
were tightened and active employment measures were implemented. In addition, the 
duration of entitlements differs according to regional labor market performance. In 
regions with average or above average labor market performance, the period of enti-
tlement can be up to 18 months. In regions with a high unemployment rate, the period 
of entitlement may be as short as six months—an arrangement which is obviously 
designed as an incentive to regional mobility. 
Slovenia’s unemployment compensation system resembles the German model14 
(before the “Hartz Reforms”) with its contributory, earnings-related threefold system: 
unemployment insurance, unemployment assistance, and ultimately a tax-financed 
system of public assistance. Benefits are comparatively generous and can amount to 
up to 70 per cent of former net earnings. 
In sum, the level of real unemployment benefits has decreased in all of the new 
EU member states. This development is due in part to the absence of indexation to 
(high) inflation rates, and in part to budgetary constraint and cuts (Knogler, 2002: 42). 
Regarding labor relations and wage determination, centralized wage bargaining 
is of declining importance. This is due to the absence of uniform labor legislation, low 
levels of collective action on the part of the employers, and the declining significance 
of works councils. Labor relations in the new member states seem to emulate Anglo-
Saxon models, although union density in these countries is on average similar to the 
degree found in the EU-15. Labor markets are still not yet uniformly regulated con-
cerning labor law and collective agreements (cf. Walwei, 2004: 2; Knogler, 2002: 15). 
As far as internal patterns of income distribution are concerned, the new member 
states are close to the EU-15 average (see table 10), with Gini-coefficients for Poland 
                                                          
14 The first unemployment legislation in Slovenia (then a republic within Yugoslavia) was passed in 
1974; the Slovenian system emulated in fact the German system. 
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and the Baltic states being at the upper end of their EU-15 counterparts. However, the 
external disparities between old and new member states with regard to absolute wage 
levels remain substantial. 
Table 10: Gini-Coefficient for Income Distribution—New Member States 
(EU-8) and the EU-15 
Countries Year Gini Coefficient  
Czech Republic  2001 25,0 
Estonia  2002 35,0 
Hungary 2001 23,0 
Latvia  2002 34,0 
Lithuania  2001 32,0 
Poland  2001 30,0 
Slovakia  1992 19,5 
Slovenia  2000 22,0 
EU-15 1999 22,0 
EU-15 range  23-24 
Source: Walwei (2004: 3). 
As to income inequality within the European Union as a whole, eastern enlargement 
increases the Gini-coefficient dramatically (see table 11). Not only did the Gini-
coefficient rise, but also the percentage of the low-income population segment jumped 
from 19.9 (EU-15) to almost 30 per cent with the last enlargement. Any further 
enlargement will increase inequality and poverty even more, and push roughly half of 
the European population below the poverty threshold. 
The prospects for intensive integration within the enlarged European Union are 
gloomy, and fears of increasing migration are widespread and intense, particularly so 
in countries along the border between the EU-15 and the EU-8. However, recent esti-
mates raise doubts about massive migration coming to materialize. According to one 
estimate, annual migration on an order of magnitude of one to one-and-a-half million 
people is to be expected for the next fifteen years (Höhnekopp et al., 2004: 4). This 
comparatively low number is due to demographic factors. The new member states face 
the same demographic developments as the EU-15—a decreasing labor force and an 
increasing share of elderly people—albeit with a time lag. Also, some of the EU-8 will 
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turn from emigration into immigration countries, because they are likely to become 
attractive destinations for migrant laborers from Belarus, Russia, the Ukraine, and 
Moldova. Assuming that labor migration within the EU-25 will follow patterns known 
from the past among the EU-15, migrants will exhibit high-level skills, and their 
movements will constitute a “brain drain” towards the West (ibid.; Knogler, 2005 and 
see above.).  
Table 11: Income, Inequality, and Poverty in the EU 
EU 
Constellation 
or Country Population1 
Average 
Income 
Median 
Income 
Gini- 
Index 
Percentage 
Low Income2 
EU-6  222 9,326 7,892 31.0 12.5 
EU-9  289 9,343 7,892 32.1 14.2 
EU-12  348 8,633 7,166 34.2 19.9 
EU-15  370 8,622 7,274 34.2 19.9 
EU-25  444 7,685 6,231 38.0 29.6 
EU-273  476 7,314 5,959 39.9 33.3 
EU-284  535 6,793 5,426 42.3 38.5 
EU-28+5  550 6,662 4,973 43.0 40.0 
EU-28++6  620 6,138 4,633 45.4 45.6 
USA  258 12,381 9,924 39.4 10.0 
Australia 18 9,083 7,600 34.5 10.0 
Canada 29 11,716 10,082 31.0 10.0 
India 901 521 443 32.8 100.0 
1 In millions. 
2 Income below 50 per cent median of EU-6. 
3 EU-27 = EU-25 + Bulgaria and Romania. 
4 EU-28 = EU-25 + Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. 
5 EU 28+ = EU-28 + Western Balkans. 
6 EU 28 ++ = EU-28 + Western Balkans, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. 
Source: Boix (2004: 7). 
The variety of institutional designs, levels, scope, and duration of and minimum re-
quirements for benefits owe to different factors. Different strategies of privatization 
matter, since their structure and their success or failure led to different results in terms 
of job loss and institutional designs for protection against unemployment (cf. Stark 
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and Bruszt, 1998; Cerami, 2005: 119). Moreover, countries reacted differently to 
international pressures to reform or implement systems for protection against unem-
ployment; social and political mediation resulted in different policy outcomes.  
The implementation of active labor market policies has been only recently en-
forced in most of the countries under study (with the notable exception of Hungary 
which has coped most successfully with unemployment in the region). This delay is 
due to two developments. First, public attitudes towards unemployment tended to 
regard it as a transitional feature or even as “healthy” for more rapid economic devel-
opment away from the artificial planned economy under the communist regimes. This 
attitude was fostered additionally by the neo-liberal rhetoric employed by political 
elites (e.g., in the Czech Republic).Only in very recent years has it been corrected as a 
result of persisting, high rates of unemployment. Second, as pointed out in section 2.2, 
social exclusion through a non-inclusive labor market came into the focus of attention 
in most of the CEE countries only via the process of accession, and the necessity to 
comply with European standards and take part in European programs. Thus, no consis-
tent unemployment protection and compensation model in the region can be identified.  
Conclusions 
After reviewing some features and developments in CEE social protection systems, 
there is no clear indication that a new and distinctive model of post-communist wel-
fare states has emerged. Only two characteristics are shared by all of the EU-8 new 
member states. First, corporate and personal income tax rates in the EU-8 region are 
considerably lower than in the EU-15 (see section 1.2). The same is true for social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (see table 5). Second, all new member states 
implemented a Bismarckian type of social insurance system during the 1990s (see 
table 7), and they accumulate revenues predominantly via social security contributions 
levied on wages or through direct income tax. As a result, and given the high unem-
ployment rates and poor labor market performance, the burden of non-wage labor 
costs appears excessive in the CEE countries or, at any rate, far too high to permit a 
smooth transition to anything that could be called “full employment”. At the same 
time, none of the new member states in the CEE has abandoned its commitment to 
state responsibility for social security, or turned to market-liberal models of privatiza-
tion. 
Focusing on the institutional arrangements and regime characteristics of social 
security in the EU-8 countries, there is hardly any pattern that is distinctive to post-
communist welfare states, which would apply to all of them. In spite of the neo-liberal 
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rhetoric of some segments of the new political elites, no country actually implemented 
a “market economy without an adjective” (Vaclav Klaus) nor did (or indeed could) 
any government stick to the old universal communist welfare regimes. Change was 
often incremental and the result of internal debates (and, for the political elites, the 
necessity to negotiate changes with their constituencies) and external pressures (not 
least through accession). Historical legacies probably played a role in the implementa-
tion of the Bismarckian-style social insurance; communist traces are more difficult to 
identify (and probably more likely to be found in local administrations with their 
shortcomings, than at the level of overall regime properties). Thus, it seems that the 
new member states face similar problems to those experienced in the EU-15, despite 
the vastly inferior level of economic and labor market performance of the former. 
Furthermore, the EU-8 are trying to cope with these problems in ways that do not 
differ significantly from the institutional patterns and reform strategies that are found 
in continental welfare states within the EU-15. Given the severe budgetary constraints 
confronting the CEE countries and the more strongly rooted egalitarian attitudes 
among their populations, their governments must constantly balance social policies 
between ambitious goals and expectations, on the one hand, and restricted capabilities 
of fulfilling them, on the other. Nevertheless, radical reforms might be easier to im-
plement in the new member states, because vested interests and their veto power are 
arguably not as deeply rooted as they are in at least some of the EU-15 countries. 
Taking into account the overall picture of the institutional features and related 
problems of the CEE welfare state, we cannot detect a “new” social model in this 
region. As to the three scenarios of CEE welfare state developments that have been 
suggested by Kovács (2002), the “muddling through” narrative is by far the most 
plausible one. The times of consistent “models” or “regimes” of European welfare 
states seem to be over anyway, and pragmatic “hybridization” (Giddens), or eclectic 
attempts to balance given internal and external pressures, seems to be the dominant 
trajectory in the evolution of social protection arrangements. At any rate, portraying 
the new members from the CEE region as agents of neo-liberal welfare state reform is 
simply wrong. Such mistaken notions have sometimes been used by political elites in 
EU-15 member states in order to denounce eastern enlargement and to depict the new 
member states as threats to continental European welfare states. There is little reason 
for doubting that such misrepresentations (including the specter of the “Polish 
plumber”) have contributed to spreading fear regarding the new member states among 
western European publics. However (and to the extent that the economies of the new 
member states display some of the same competitive advantage as those of some of the 
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older member states), this is not due to generally more austere welfare states (and 
hence lower non-wage costs of labor), but rather to lower wages and lower taxes. But 
regardless of the truth content of the arguments which are mustered for the spreading 
of such fears, the result is very unlikely to be more than at best a highly qualified 
solidarity encompassing all member states of the large EU-27, where “solidarity” 
means the readiness to recognize and respect the rights and legitimate pursuit of inter-
ests of all fellow Europeans and fellow member states. 
In order to model the unfolding conflicts between old and new member states—
admittedly in a somewhat speculative manner—we suggest a sequence of three stages 
of strategic objectives and driving motivational forces. The three stages, which apply 
unequally to the old and the new member states, are (1) formulation of strategic objec-
tives, (2) awareness of the costs of achieving those objectives, and (3) frustration with 
the extent to which the objectives may or may not have actually been reached. Starting 
with the old member states, the original motivation for promoting eastern enlargement 
was doubtlessly of a primarily political nature, because the priorities of the EU (as 
well as NATO) around the mid-1990s consisted in helping to consolidate democracy 
and the rule of law in the CEE region through conditionality, and thereby to “normal-
ize” the political development of prospective member states through soft forms of 
outside control. In contrast, the new member states, having just escaped from a tight 
and authoritarian form of supranational control were mostly reluctant and skeptical 
about joining Europe; but this skepticism was consistently trumped by the prospects of 
post-socialist reconstruction that were based upon the expectation of free access (of 
goods and workers) to western markets, the inflow of FDI into the CEE region, and 
the claims to modernization subsidies that would come from the EU once full mem-
bership status was achieved.  
Once the enlargement process was completed (on 1 May 2004 and 1 January 1 
2007 respectively), both sides experienced a wave of “second thoughts.” Among the 
new member states, these consisted in the realization of failures and an awareness of 
necessary sacrifices concerning the respective subordinate objectives. As to the older 
member states, their intended political aim of having stable and democratic eastern 
neighbors was partly offset by the growing economic challenges originating from the 
CEE region. These challenges came in the form of an inflow of goods and labor, and 
an outflow of investment and funds allocated from EU budgets. Similarly, and in a 
strictly symmetrical fashion, elites as well as non-elites in the new member states 
began to perceive the political costs of membership—costs that were framed in terms 
of losses of national autonomy and the need to comply with EU-wide rules and poli-
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cies. Thus both sides began to perceive reasons for asking themselves, “Was the price 
we had to pay for achieving our primary objectives really worth it?” 
Finally—and if we read a variety of indicators that emerge in the newly inte-
grated political economy of Europe rightly—a third phase of regret and frustration 
may well become dominant as the dynamics of the EU-27 unfold. To put it bluntly, 
both sides will begin to see that what they actually received for paying the price they 
paid is less than what they had anticipated and hoped for. From an EU-15 point of 
view, this second disappointment relates to the fact that neither regime stability nor the 
liberal democratic consensus (nor, for that matter, a modern and reasonably corrup-
tion-free state structure; not to mention CEE reluctance to join distinctively “Euro-
pean” arrangements for foreign and international security policy) has taken firm roots 
in all parts of the region—a disillusion that is all the deeper as it comes with the reali-
zation that, after formal enlargement, the leverage of conditionality has practically 
become inoperative. Conversely, the EU-10 new member states (that is, growing parts 
of both their elites and mass constituencies) have also begun to look back on the deal 
they were drawn into and to see it as a definitely unfavorable one: not only have they 
sacrificed “too much” (in terms of national autonomy) but also received “too little” in 
return, i.e., in terms of the older member states’ preparedness to assist them on the 
road to robust economic prosperity, rather than keeping them in a position of perma-
nent economic dependency.  
Time will show whether, or to what extent, the second and third stages of this 
gloomy model will materialize. Concerning the first stage and the initial patterns of 
motivation at the beginning of the process that led to eastern enlargement, it is worth 
noting that the enthusiasm for “returning to Europe,” both within the candidate coun-
tries as well as in the EU-15 member states was markedly qualified. Eurobarometer 42 
(1994) data show that, at the time of the survey (i.e., shortly before the actual acces-
sion of Sweden, Austria, and Finland in 1995), the least welcome and least favorably 
assessed West European candidate country (Norway) was supported by 75 per cent of 
EU-12 citizens, running 20 percentage points ahead in terms of the support for mem-
bership compared to the most welcome East European candidate country (Hungary), 
with a 55 per cent favorable rating15 (EU Commission 2006: 7). In other words, the 
political divide continues to play a significant role—a legacy of the Iron Curtain as 
well as other historical, cultural, economic, geographic, linguistic, and religious differ-
                                                          
15 Quite analogously, when surveyed in 2005, EU-25 citizens supported further enlargement of the 
membership, this time with Iceland being the least supported country among West European states 
(68 per cent in support) as opposed to Croatia being the most favorable case in the East (51 per cent, 
with Romania enjoying just 43 per cent (Eurobarometer 64).  
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ences that exist between the EU-15 and the EU-8. Where accession is in fact approved 
on either side, such “support for enlargement reflects to a large extent non-altruistic 
motives” (ibid.: 6). At the point of actual accession in May, 2004, the supporters of 
enlargement within the EU-15 just barely outnumbered the opponents by 42 to 39 per 
cent (Eurobarometer 61). In retrospect, EU-25 citizens express an increasing degree of 
dissatisfaction with the outcome of eastern enlargement; negative opinions increased 
from 35 per cent, in fall 2004, to 39 per cent by (fall 2005 (Eurobarometer 62, 64). 
After all, among the EU-8, only in Slovenia and Lithuania did an absolute majority of 
eligible citizens (54 and 58 per cent, respectively) support the accession of their coun-
tries. 
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